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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
evidence, analogous to prior threats, tends to show the victim's violent
propensities toward the defendant.4"
Undoubtedly future cases will raise questions concerning the admissi-
bility of evidence of the victim's character and background which remain
unanswered. It is urged that the court continue its functional interpretation
of the statute and require examination of the probative value of the
evidence in light of the purpose for which it is offered.
Diane L. Crochet
LAND OCCUPIERS' LIABILITY-THE DUTY OF REASONABLE CARE TO ALL
Louisiana, along with all other jurisdictions, long determined the
duty of a land occupier towards those injured on his property by examining
the status of the entrant-either invitee, licensee or trespasser-and found
a separate and distinct duty owed to each class. Recently, the Louisiana
Supreme Court, in two separate decisions, indicated its desire to abandon
these classifications and impose upon the land occupier a single duty of
reasonable care towards all entrants.' In attempting to appraise the impact
of these decisions, two questions must be considered. Does the duty of
"reasonable care" dictate that identical precautions be taken for the safety
of all entrants? If not, how will the facts surrounding the entry affect the
determination of what is "the reasonable care" to which the particular
entrant is entitled? Analyzing the development of the classification system
in Louisiana may help formulate answers.
Long before the development of general negligence principles, Eng-
lish courts established the three classes of entrants, 2 justifying the system
40. This rationale could be extended to admit evidence of the victim's violent
acts against persons closely associated with the defendant-for example, the de-
fendant's family.
1. Shelton v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 334 So. 2d 406 (La. 1976); Cates v.
Beauregard Elec. Coop., 328 So. 2d 367 (La. 1976). In both cases, the court
affirmed the decisions of the lower courts although finding it unnecessary to use the
classification system. Two recent circuit court cases have accepted the abandon-
ment of the classification system as the new Louisiana position. Vidrine v. Missouri
Farm Ass'n., 339 So. 2d 877 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976); Molaison v. West Bros., 338
So. 2d 726 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976).
2. Marsh, The History and Comparative Law of Invitees, Licensees, and
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upon a social policy allowing land holders maximum freedom in using
their property. 3 Intending to limit, liability, the courts determined the land
occupier's duty by the status of the entrant at the time of his injury.4 The
duty owed a trespasser-one who entered or remained without permis-
sion-was to refrain from "wilfully or wantonly" injuring him.5 The
licensee, whose presence, though without invitation or business purpose,
was consented to or tolerated, was protected from active negligence of the
land holder and had to be warned of any known but hidden hazards. 6
Finally, land holders owed the greatest duty to an invitee-one who
entered because of invitation or inducement, generally to bestow some
"economic benefit" upon the land holder. 7 He was owed the enhanced
duty of reasonable care, which included the positive obligation of inspect-
ing the property and taking reasonable precautions to protect him from
foreseeable dangers. 8
Trespassers, 69 L.Q.REv. 182 (1953); Comment, Torts-Abrogation of Common-
Law Entrant Classes of Trespasser, Licensee, and Invitee, 25 VAND. L. REV. 623
(1972).
3. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 27.1 at 1430-32 (1956)
[hereinafter cited as HARPER & JAMES]; James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land:
Duties Owed to Trespassers, 63 YALE L.J. 144, 146 (1953). It has been suggested
that a more basic reason for the classification system was the reluctance of judges
to allow a jury of the unpropertied class a free reign in reaching verdicts against the
land-owning defendant. See Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases: II, 29
COLUM. L. REV. 255, 271-72 & n.56 (1929); Malone, Contributory Negligence and
the Landowner Cases, 29 MINN. L. REV. 61, 62-66 (1945).
4. The definitions given here are simplified and do not reflect all developments
which have occurred in the classification system.
5. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 58 at 362 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited
as PROSSER]; Comment, Land Occupier's Liability to Trespassers, 18 LA. L. REV.
716 (1958).
6. E.g., Cothern v. LaRocca, 255 La. 673, 232 So. 2d 473 (1970); Taylor v.
Baton Rouge Sash & Door Works, Inc., 68 So. 2d 159 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1953);
Comment, Invitee Status in Louisiana, 27 LA. L. REV. 796 (1967).
7. At its inception, the invitee class was solely composed of "business
visitors." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 332 (1934). A "business visitor" was defined
as "a person who is invited or permitted to enter or remain on land in the possession
of another for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings
between them." Id. Later, Professor Prosser asserted that this "economic benefit"
test was not accurate. He placed greater importance on the "invitation" as expres-
sing an assurance that the property was prepared for the entrant's visit. This is the
view accepted by the majority of jurisdictions today. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 61 at
389; Prosser, Business Visitors and Invitees, 26 MINN. L. REV. 573 (1942). See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §332 (1965).
8. E.g., Alexander v. General Accident Fire & Liab. Assurance Corp., 98 So.
2d 730 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957); PROSSER, supra note 5, § 61 at 392; Comment,
Invitee Status in Louisiana, 27 LA. L. REV. 796 (1967).
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Application of the rigid common law classification system9 often
produced harsh results;' 0 moreover, hastened by the Industrial Revolution,
the social policy supporting limited liability changed, as courts in all
American jurisdictions became more willing to protect personal safety at
the expense of property rights." In Louisiana, as elsewhere, this change
was manifested by the expansion of certain classes and the creation of sub-
categories within others. Thus, entrants who were known to trespass
frequently on a limited area, 12 or trespassing children who should have
been anticipated in certain situations,' 3 became entitled to an enhanced
duty. Also, once trespassers were discovered, they were all protected from
active negligence.' 4 The licensee, as well, was protected from active
negligence, !5 but more importantly, he was entitled to be warned of any
known hidden hazards.' 6 Although the duty towards the invitee
9. One often quoted passage expresses this rigidity: "What I particularly wish
to emphasize is that there are the three different classes-invitees, licensees,
trespassers . . . Now the line that separates each of these three classes is an
absolutely rigid line. There is no half-way house, no no-man's land between adja-
cent territories." Lord Dunedin, in Robert Addie & Sons v. Dumbreck, [1929] A.C.
358, 371 (Scot.), cited, in PROSSER, supra note 5, § 8 at 357 n.63.
10. E.g., Dunbar v. Olivieri, 97 Col. 381, 50 P.2d 64 (1935), where a trespassing
nine year old child, permanently crippled by burns resulting from an unattended
bonfire in violation of a statute, was denied recovery.
11. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 58 at 360.
12. E.g., Wood v. State Dep't. of Highways, 295 So. 2d 78 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1974); Taylor v. Baton Rouge Sash & Door Works, Inc., 68 So. 2d 159 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1953).
13. Recovery in these cases was allowed under the "attractive nuisance"
doctrine. Louisiana courts long recognized this doctrine, and a large body of case
law dealt with interpreting its factors. Comment, The Attractive Nuisance Doctrine
in Louisiana, 10 LA. L. REV. 469 (1950). See also the comments of Professor
Malone in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1965-1966 Term-
Torts, 26 LA. L. REV. 510, 524 (1966),. where he urged the abandonment of the
"attractive nuisance" terminology. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 59 at 364-76.
14. Almost all these cases involved railway operations. Many times Louisiana
courts have stated that the duty is only to refrain from wilful and wanton miscon-
duct, but found that the raliroad's failure to use reasonable care amounted to wilful
and wanton negligence. Roberts v. Louisiana Ry. & Navigation Co., 132 La. 446,61
So. 522 (1913); Comment, Land Occupier's Liability to Trespassers, 18 LA. L. REV.
716 (1958).
15. E.g., Cothern v. LaRocca, 255 La. 673, 232 So. 2d 473 (1970); PROSSER,
supra note 5, § 60 at 379.
16. Compare Taylor v. Baton Rouge Sash & Door Works, Inc., 68 So. 2d 159
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1953) with Melancon v. Zoar Missionary Baptist Church, 222 So.
2d 308 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969). E.g., Cothern v. LaRocca, 255 La. 673, 232 So. 2d
473 (1970); Savell v. Foster, 149 So. 2d 210 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 244 La.
148, 150 So. 2d 769 (1963).
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(reasonable care) did not change,17 the group entitled to this enhanced duty
was enlarged. No doubt the greatest impact in this area of Louisiana law
occurred in 1957 when the "social guest" was elevated to invitee status in
Alexander v. General Accident Fire & Liability Assurance Corp. 18
In practically all jurisdictions, the social guest, even one expressly
invited and graciously welcomed, is not an "invitee"-"a distinction
which has puzzled generations of law students and even some lawyers."' 9
In Alexander, the court, surveying the history of this anomaly and noting
the frequent criticism of the classification system,2° concluded: "We see
no reason why the duty of ordinary reasonable care should not be owed to
social guests who are expressly invited to the premises as well as to other
invitees. "21 The entrant who came with only an invitation thus became
entitled to the enhanced duty of reasonable care; the "business purpose"
was no longer required. 22 Only those who entered or remained on the
17. Over the years, the extent of the duty of reasonable care has enlarged. A
review of recent Louisiana Supreme Court decisions in the "slip and fall" area will
illustrate how broad that duty has become. See Natal v. Phoenix Assurance Co.,
305 So. 2d 438 (La. 1974); Note, 37 LA. L. REV. 634 (1977).
18. 98 So. 2d 730 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957), noted in 19 LA. L. REV. 906 (1959).
Justice (then Judge) Tate's opinion was later approved by the Louisiana Supreme
Court in Foggin v. General Guar. Ins. Co., 250 La. 347, 195 So. 2d 636 (1967).
Connecticut, through statute, made the social guest an invitee in 1963. CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 52-557a (1968). Ohio created a separate class for the social guest. Scheibel
v. Lipton, 156 Ohio St. 308, 102 N.E.2d 453 (1951). Michigan elevated the social
guest to invitee status for a short time but later repositioned adult social guests to
licensees. Compare Genessee Merchants Bank & Trust Co. v. Payne, 6 Mich. App.
204, 148 N.W.2d 503 (1967), aff'd, 381 Mich. 234, 161 N.W.2d 17 (1968) with
Preston v. Slezlak, 383 Mich. 442, 175 N.W.2d 759 (1970).
19. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 60 at 378. "The reason usually given is that the
guest understands when he comes that he is to be placed on the same footing as one
of the family, and must take the premises as the occupier himself uses them,
without any inspection or preparation for his safety .... ." Id.
20. "The utility in tort law of such highly refined and rigid distinctions, harking
back to Nineteenth Century English concepts of the peculiar sanctity of land, is
questioned, for tort liability is usually apportioned upon a duty to take reasonable
precautions against undue risk of reasonably foreseeable harm under all the circum-
stances of each individual case." 98 So. 2d at 733 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
21. Id. at 734. Although the holding specified "express" invitation, the courts
have had little difficulty in satisfying this requisite. See Daire v. Southern Farm
Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 143 So. 2d 389 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
22. Early in the Alexander opinion, as the court was reviewing the history of
the classification system, it defined "invitee"by traditional reference to economic
benefit. It is unfortunate that later courts have seized this language when attempting
to define "invitee," for it obscures the clear fact that the Alexander court felt the
"invitation" test was more accurate. As the court said: "[While] in some instances
the greater standard of care owed to an invitee may properly be based upon the
'economic benefit' theory, the more general rule is that an express invitation to be
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property through the land occupier's sufferance were left in the licensee
class. This significant increase in the number of entrants entitled to
reasonable care resulted in more cases being decided on the factual
question of breach of duty, rather than on the legal question of the
plaintiff's status.
The Alexander court was not alone in its skepticism towards the
usefulness of the tripartite classifications; at the same time, commentators
and courts in many jurisdictions also called for reform. 23 The classification
system had become a patchwork of exceptions and distinctions developed
to mitigate its harshness. The law in all states had become one of
"exceptions" to the rule; and the real question-whether under the facts
of the case, the land occupier had been negligent in causing the entrant's
injury-was being overshadowed by attempts to fit the entrant into one of
the classes or one of the many exceptions. Therefore, few were surprised
when in 1968, California became the first state24 to abolish completely the
common law classifications and impose a single duty of ordinary care
towards all entrants.
In Rowland v. Christian, 25 the California Supreme Court noted that
the common law tripartite system was a departure from the fundamental
concept embodied in its Civil Code-a person is liable for injuries caused
on the premises, as distinguished from a merely permissive use thereof, carries with
it an implied assurance to the invitee that the premises are reasonably safe for his
use and that the host has exercised ordinary care for his safety." 98 So. 2d at 734.
But see Foggin v. General Guar. Ins. Co., 250 La. 347, 195 So. 2d 636 (1967);
Currington v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 281 So. 2d 150 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied,
283 So. 2d 498 (La. 1973).
23. E.g., Wolfson v. Chelist, 284 S.W. 2d 477 (Mo. 1955); Taylor v. New
Jersey Highway Auth., 22 N.J. 454, 126 A.2d 313 (1956); Potts v. Amis, 62 Wash. 2d
777, 384 P.2d 825 (1963); Hughes, Duties to Trespassers: A Comparative Survey and
Reevaluation, 68 YALE L.J. 633 (1959); Comment, Landowners' Liability in New
Jersey: The Limitation of Traditional Immunities, 12 RUT. L. REV. 599 (1958).
24. England, which originated the classification system, abolished the distinc-
tion between invitees and licensees by statute in 1957. OCCUPIERS' LIABILITY ACT, 5
& 6 Eliz. II, c. 31 § 2, 303 (1957) discussed in Payne, The Occupiers' Liability Act,
21 MOD. L. REV. 359 (1958). The United States Supreme Court abolished the
invitee-licensee distinction in admiralty law in 1959. Kermarec v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959).
25. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968). The plaintiff, a social
guest, injured his hand when the cracked knob of a cold water faucet broke. There
was evidence that the defendant was aware of the defect but had failed to warn the
plaintiff.
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by his carelessness.2 6 In rejecting the historical considerations27 which led
to this departure, the court stated:
We decline to follow and perpetuate such rigid classifications. The
proper test to be applied to the liability of the possessor of land...
is whether in the management of his property he has acted as a
reasonable man in view of the probability of injury to others, and
although the plaintiff's status as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee may
. . .have some bearing on the question of liability, the status is not
determinative. 28
The Rowland test was quoted and adopted by the Louisiana Supreme
Court in Cates v. Beauregard Electric Cooperative, Inc. 29 where the court
found the common law classification system "to be of little help in
applying C.C. 2315.
' 30
In all jurisdictions that have considered abolishing some or all of the
common law distinctions, the major concern has been that abandoning
these judicially imposed guidelines would cause a substantial increase
in jury findings for plaintiffs. 3' Despite some evidence to the con-
26. The provisions of the California Civil Code relating to negligence are similar
to LA. CIv. CODE art. 2316. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714 (West 1954) provides that:
"Everyone is responsible, not only for the results of his wilful acts, but also for an
injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management
of his property or person .... ." LA. Civ. CODE art. 2316 states that: "Every
person is responsible for the damage he occasions not merely by his act, but by his
negligence, his imprudence, or his want of skill."
27. HARPER & JAMES, supra note 3, § 27.1 at 1432; see the text at note 3, supra.
28. 69 Cal. 2d at 119, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104. Rowland has served
as a touchstone for other jurisdictions wishing to abolish some or all of the
traditional distinctions. Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir.
1972); Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537, 489 P.2d 308 (1971); Wood
v. Camp, 284 So. 2d'691 (Fla. 1973); Pickard v. City & County of Honolulu, 51
Haw. 134, 452 P.2d 445 (1969); Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 297 N.E.2d 43
(1973); Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 199 N.W.2d 639 (1972); Mariorenzi v.
Joseph DiPonte, Inc., 333 A.2d 127 (R.I. 1975).
29. 328 So. 2d 367 (La. 1976). The court affirmed this approach in Shelton v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 334 So. 2d 406 (La. 1976). In Cates, no landowner duty was
fixed since it was found that the plaintiff's injury was caused by his own voluntary
exposure to a dangerous electric wire. In Shelton, the court concluded that the
condition which caused the injury (paint remover residue washed to the ground)
was not unreasonably dangerous. Therefore, there was no duty to correct the
situation or provide a warning. Since there was no breach of duty, plaintiff was
denied recovery.
30. 328 So. 2d at 370.
31. E.g., Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97
(1968) (Burke, J., dissenting); Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 691, 694 (Fla. 1973);
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trary,32 most courts and commentators feel that juries are "plaintiff orient-
ed," and will, more likely than not, decide in the plaintiff's favor if given
the opportunity. Accordingly, the plaintiff must "get his case to the jury";
and the classification system can be a substantial roadblock in this effort.
If the judge finds as a matter of law that, because of the plaintiff's class,
no duty is owed, the case will never get to the jury. Post-Rowland
experience has shown that the results are much as they were before, with
the only group of plaintiffs benefitting substantially by the abandonment of
the classification system being social guests. 33 Louisiana should not
experience any change in this area because a civil jury trial in Louisiana is
a rare event and because the social guest in Louisiana is already entitled to
a duty of reasonable care.3 4 Since the Louisiana Supreme Court adopted
the duty-risk approach in determining negligence,35 lower courts have had
ample opportunity to address the question of risk exclusion or inclusion in
analyzing "reasonable care"; accordingly, there is a large body of case
law in which the question of duty rather than status was the issue the court
resolved.36
The class of trespassers has also generated a great deal of discussion
in jurisdictions which have considered modifying the classification
system, with the majority of these jurisdictions deciding to exclude them
from coverage under a standard of reasonable care .37 In these juris-
dictions, the courts have generally found it "unreasonable to subject an
owner to a 'reasonable care' test against someone who isn't supposed to be
there and about whom he does not know. "38 The problem associated with
Comment, Torts-Abrogation of Common-Law Entrant Classes of Trespasser,
Licensee, and Invitee, 25 VAND. L. REV. 623, 635 (1972).
32. Kalven, A Report on the Jury Project of the University of Chicago Law
School, 24 INS. COUNSEL J. 368 (1957).
33. See Note, 25 ALA. L. REV. 401, 413 (1973) for an extensive treatment of
post-Rowland decisions.
34. See the text at note 21, supra.
35. Dixie Drive It Yourself System v. American Beverage Co., 242 La. 471, 137
So. 2d 298 (1962); see Robertson, Reason Versus Rule in Louisiana Tort Law:
Dialogues on Hill v. Lundin & Associates, Inc., 34 LA. L. REV. 1 (1973).
36. E.g., Scott v. I.L. Lyons & Co., Ltd., 329 So. 2d 795 (La. App. 4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 333 So. 2d 239 (1976); Millet v. Allstate Ins. Co., 319 So. 2d 803 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1975); Natal v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 286 So. 2d 738 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1973), rev'd, 305 So. 2d 438 (1974). It is highly probable that the expansion of
the invitee class to include social guests is the major reason the court felt it was not
necessary to abandon the whole system, and accordingly waited until eight years
after Rowland to do so.
37. E.g., Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1973). Hawaii, Minnesota, and
Massachusetts are in accord. See the cases cited in note 28, supra.
38. Id. at 693.
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the trespasser should be considered in light of the second question posed
earlier: How will the facts surrounding the plaintiff's entry affect the duty
determination?
Louisiana courts have stated many times that the landowner is not an
insurer of those entering his property.3 9 The standard of reasonable care is
just that-reasonable care; it does have its limits. Reasonable care surely
dictates that a store owner provide well lighted aisles for his patrons to use
during nighttime shopping, but it does not demand that he keep them lit all
night to protect a possible trespasser. Reasonable care only demands that
the possessor of land act where the presence of entrants can be anticipated
as to place and/or time. If they are invited or induced to visit, the
storeowner or homeowner knows of their presence and can anticipate their
arrival by taking the necessary precautions. Even the presence of one who
is only tolerated can usually be anticipated; and it is not hard to imagine
situations where even the trespasser could be anticipated. 4' The issue
should not be focused on the status of the entrant, for the real question is
this: Was this land occupier's conduct towards this entrant reasonable,
considering the degree to which his presence could be anticipated?
Viewed in this light, the trespasser problem does not appear nearly so
formidable. When unknown and unable to be anticipated, the trespasser is
entitled to little if any protection, not because it is unreasonable to allow
him the protection of "reasonable care," but because reasonable care
dictates that little protection be afforded to this entrant. If he is a known
trespasser of a limited area, or a discovered trespasser, his presence can
and should be anticipated; therefore, reasonable care dictates greater
precautions.
Unanticipated entry is the only element which can explain the limited
duty towards firemen and policemen; the "status" system could never
logically explain classifying them as licensees when they came upon the
premises at unusual times in response to an emergency. They are certainly
providing an "economic benefit"; and their presence in those cases is
always desired, often specifically requested. The only real answer is that
their arrival cannot be anticipated; and having the premises prepared for
their entry at all times is too great a burden for the land occupier-thus
"unreasonable.",41
39. E.g., Shelton v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 334 So. 2d 406 (La. 1976); Landry
v. Hazelwood & Santillo, Inc., 330 So. 2d 683 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976).
40. See note 12, supra.
41. Some would argue that a test of anticipated entry is the same thing as
"foreseeability." Many risks are foreseeable even though their occurrence cannot
be anticipated. It is "foreseeable" that a policeman will respond to an alarm, but
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It is important to remember that what has been discussed above is
only one aspect in the duty-risk analysis of negligence--determination of
the land occupier's duty. The plaintiff must still prove that the duty was
breached, that the breach was the cause-in-fact of his injury, and that the
risk and injury caused were within the scope of protection afforded by the
duty--only then is there liability.42 In analyzing this last element of risk
exclusion or inclusion, policy questions are considered; of special import-
ance in these cases is the ability of the occupier to "spread his risk"
through insurance. Court decisions increasing the possibility of land
holder liability may lead to added insurance costs that, in the case of the
storeowner, are eventually absorbed by the customer. But the homeowner
ordinarily has no medium through which the added cost of insurance can
be passed, and therefore, he must absorb it himself. Abandoning the
classification system will allow Louisiana courts to increase the storeown-
er's liability in the proper case without producing additional cost to the
homeowner since the courts will not have to apply their conclusions to all
entrants in a particular former class. It cannot be said that the supreme
court has opened the door to wholesale recovery by plaintiffs.
43
In the Cates decision, the Louisiana Supreme Court completed the
work started by the Alexander court in 1957. In eliminating the procedural
step of "status" determination, the court once again affirmed its belief
that a duty-risk analysis should be used to determine negligence under
Civil Code article 2315. Finally, the court eliminated an obsolete road-
block to reaching the ultimate question in tort suits against land posses-
sors-what would a reasonable man do in light of this entrant's anticipated
presence?
Howard Daigle, Jr.
the time and place of such entry cannot be anticipated. A court's conclusion that a
risk was "not foreseeable" often means no more than there would be too great an
economic burden placed on the storeowner or landowner to protect the entrant
from the risk since his presence could not have been anticipated. See Malone,
supra note 3; Prosser, supra note 7.
42. See note 35, supra.
43. It is not insignificant that in both Cates and Shelton the defendants were
homeowners and the plaintiffs were denied recovery. Shelton is particularly inter-
esting in that the injury occurred in the home to a visiting member of the homeown-
er's family.
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